Nuclear Safety Software Verification Report
The NSSVR provides evidence and documentation of the Independent Verification Organization's verification effort as part of Nuclear Safety Design Certification for nuclear weapon systems software.
Description & Purpose
Application & Interrelationship
Use & Relationship
Following the purpose, methods, and procedures the Nuclear Safety Software Verification Plan (NSSVP) defines, the Nuclear Safety Software Verification Report(s) (NSSVR) provides evidence and documentation of the verification effort as part of Nuclear Safety Design Certification (NSDC). Air Force Safety Center Nuclear Weapons Safety Branch (AFSEC/SEWN) provides NSDC to system program offices for specific nuclear weapon systems and nuclear weapon system modifications.
Chapter 4 of Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software describes the NSSVR. DAFMAN 91-119 implements Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program. DAFI 91-101 explains the process for NSDC. Both DAFMAN 91-119 and DAFI 91-101 are available without restriction on the Air Force E-Publishing website, https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/.
a. This Data Item Description (DID) applies to the acquisition of software for nuclear weapon systems that must be nuclear safety design certified per DAFI 91-101. Per Chapter 2 of DAFMAN 91-119, software is "...application software that executes sequentially and reconfigurable logic implementations that use a hardware description language for development."
b. DAFMAN 91-119 and DAFI 91-101 defines the information required to implement this DID. This information includes the following:
- Procedures and plans that assure independence between the Development Organization (DO) and the Independent Verification Organization (IVO);
- Compensatory measures the IVO took to address any concerns of independence between the DO and IVO;
- Verification tools, methodologies, configuration, and procedures the IVO used in performing the verification effort;
- Traceability between Nuclear Safety Objectives (NSO), Nuclear Safety Requirements (NSR), DAFMAN 91-119 requirements, verification procedures, and associated results.
c. This DID contains the content and intended use information for the data deliverable resulting from the work task described in the solicitation and defined in Chapter 4 of DAFMAN 91-119.
d. If the IVO did not provide a completed NSSVP to AFSEC/SEWN before the IVO performed the finalized verification activities, AFSEC/SEWN may not accept the results of the verification activities presented in the NSSVR.
e. All NSO and NSR examples listed in the document are examples of how an IVO could meet the requirements in DAFMAN 91-119. AFSEC/SEWN does not intend the examples to be directive. The definitions of NSO and NSR in Chapter 4 of DAFMAN 91-119 supersede this document.
f. The U.S. Navy is excluded from requirements set forth in this DID.
Preparation Instructions
References
Both DAFMAN 91-119 and DAFI 91-101 are available without restriction on the Air Force E-Publishing website, https://www.e-publishing.af.mil/
Figures
Figure Table 1. Sample software tool entry.
Figure Table 2. Sample NSO entry.
Figure Table 3. Sample NSR entry.
Figure Table 4. Sample verification procedure summary entry.
Figure Table 5. Sample verification forward trace entry.
Figure Table 6. Sample verification reverse trace entry.
Figure Table 7. Sample verification results trace entry.
Figure Table 8. Sample failed verification procedures entry.
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